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 Investing in Soils: 
Field Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso 
 
 
1. Introduction and background 
 
Africa has the world’s highest rates of rural population growth, and fastest decline in the 
land area available per farm worker (FAO 2000).  Prominent observers have argued that 
increasing land scarcity could lead to soil degradation, and perhaps irreversible declines 
in the productivity of labor and other resources applied to land (e.g. WRI 1999, UNEP 
2000).  Alternatively, land scarcity could lead farmers to invest in soil improvement, 
perhaps eventually triggering sustained growth in productivity and income as suggested 
by Boserup (1965). 
 
Earlier work has found some evidence for a Boserup effect at the aggregate level in 
Africa, using cross-country data (Lusigi and Thirtle 1997).  In this paper we look at the 
field level, using two years of survey data from Burkina Faso to quantify farmers’ 
adoption of specific soil improvement techniques, and ask how economic or policy 
conditions affect the intensity of their adoption.  Respondents are very low-income 
farmers, facing a variety of land-scarcity and land tenure regimes (Sourabi 1999).  Their 
choices could provide important insight into how cropland is managed under conditions 
of extreme scarcity and widespread degradation. 
 
Whether land scarcity leads to a downward spiral of soil degradation and yield decline, or 




the evolution of property rights over land.  Traditional land tenure systems in Burkina 
Faso and most of Africa involve revocable use-rights managed by community leaders 
(Bassett and Crummey 1993).  Such systems may have been useful in the past, but could 
be increasingly costly as population growth raises the need for long-term investments 
whose returns may be heavily “taxed” by the absence of ownership rights (Goldstein and 
Udry 1999).  Property rights are likely to be important not only for cropland but also for 
pastures, to the extent that enclosing animals facilitates the recovery of manure which is 
usually lost when herders have access to commons grazing (Dalton and Masters 1998).   
 
What is at stake in soil quality is not only the productivity of natural resources, but also 
the productivity of labor and other inputs applied to land.  Thus an increase in land 
scarcity that leads to a new property-rights regime and hence accelerated investment in 
soil quality could be the mechanism for a Boserup effect, translating higher population 
density into faster total productivity growth and faster growth of real incomes 
(Rosenzweig, Binswanger and McIntire 1988).  
 
In our survey regions as elsewhere, farmers have long experience using labor to improve 
their fields.  Two of the oldest and most important such soil and water conservation 
(SWC) techniques in Burkina Faso are bunds (low stone or dirt walls to stop surface 
runoff) and microcatchments (small holes into which compost or manure is placed and 
plants are seeded, to concentrate available moisture and nutrients).  Both techniques help 
hold soil and water for delivery to plants, producing a well-documented increase in the 




1997).  By holding soil and water in place they represent fundamental long-term 
investments that complement variable inputs, including organic as well as inorganic 
fertilizers.  Such investments could become more attractive as land becomes increasingly 
scarce relative to labor.  They may also become more attractive as farmers gain more 
secure ownership rights over land.  A third kind of incentive could come from reduced 
access to commons grazing, as more intensive livestock management makes manure 
more available for use on cropland.  This paper tests these propositions, which provide 
possible mechanisms for Boserup-type effects by which increased population, interacting 
with property rights, could lead to productivity growth over time. 
 
2.  Determinants of SWC investment 
The average level of soil and water conservation investment in Burkina Faso can be 
described as moderate.  Measuring investment level in terms of the share of land on 
which SWC techniques have been applied, in our survey areas we found bunds on 19 
percent of cropped land, microcatchments on 27 percent of cropped land, and both 
techniques together on 7 percent (Table 2).   
 
Previous studies of the determinants of SWC investment have focused on farmers’ 
subjective beliefs and sources of information (e.g. Shively 1997, Anim 1999, Baidu-
Forson 1999), as well as farmers’ material conditions such as farm assets, factor markets, 
and population pressure (e.g. Laper and Pandey 1999, Pender and Kerr 1998, Barbier 
1998 and the review by Templeton and Scherr 1997).  Here we aim to isolate the 




from the property-rights regime that governs cropland (“ownership” as opposed to use-
rights) and grazing (intensive livestock management as opposed to open-access grazing).  
These factors are investigated in the context of several control variables, such as 
socioeconomic conditions and physical geography, as listed in Table 1 and detailed 
below. 
 
2.1  Availability of cropland and farm labor 
Our core measures of land and labor abundance are cropped acreage per farm, and the 
number of men and women aged 15 and over.  We count males and females separately 
because gender influences the kinds of tasks most often undertaken, and families differ in 
composition.  We enter separate variables for land and labor, rather than the land/labor 
ratio, to capture scale effects that might arise from having more of both in a single 
household.   
 
In Burkina Faso, average farm size varies across villages by far more than could be 
explained by underlying differences in land quality, due to disease pressure and political 
boundaries influencing migration.  Since the mid-1970s, there have been large population 
movements southward to escape drought, and into valleys to take advantage of 
onchocerciasis control (Sourabie 1999).  The result is large variance in cropland scarcity 
across surveyed regions, with farm size varying by a factor of 100, from 0.2 to over 20 
hectares per household (Table 2).  Across villages, controlling for family size and 
composition, we see village-average land-labor ratios ranging from 0.2 to 0.87 hectares 




workers to facilitate comparison across households, using conversion factors from 
Tabatai 1993.) 
 
The effect cropland scarcity on SWC investment is ambiguous.  On the one hand, higher 
land scarcity could bring a substitution effect towards land-saving, labor-using techniques 
(e.g. Anim 1999 found that South African farmers with less land make greater 
investments in soil conservation, and Adesina and Zinnah 1993 found that smaller 
farmers invest more in new rice varieties).  On the other hand, indivisibilities and scale 
effects could make some new technologies more profitable on larger farms (e.g. Nichola 
and Sanders 1996 found that larger farms were more likely to adopt a hybrid sorghum in 
Sudan).  For bunds and microcatchments, farmers with less land but more labor may have 
a greater incentive to use labor to raise yields, but farmers with more land may make 
greater investments of all kinds, so the net effect of land scarcity remains ambiguous.  In 
any event, since the degree of land scarcity is largely exogenous to policy decisions, we 
are concerned less with its direct effects than with policy responses to it, including 
particularly the evolution of property rights. 
 
2.2  Property rights 
We use two distinct indicators to capture the property-rights regime governing cropland 
and grazing areas.  For cropland, we measure the security of tenure by the proportion of 
area that the farmer reported to be “borrowed” or “rented” as opposed to “owned”.  For 
pasture, we measure ease of access to commons grazing by the labor-intensity with which 





Cropland markets in Burkina offer no formal land tenure categories.  Colonial authorities 
and post-independence governments have sustained traditional use-rights, through which 
village leaders allocate land across extended families, whose leaders in turn allocate it 
among individual households.  Since 1984 a series of land-tenure decrees have been 
enacted, but in practice tenure continues to be governed by traditional arrangements 
(Sourabie 1999).  In our data, farmers reported as “owned” the land that was securely 
within the control of their own extended family.  “Borrowed” or “rented” land had been 
obtained on a temporary basis from another family.  Across our survey villages, the 
proportion of cropland not owned by the operator’s family ranged from zero in one 
village, to 54 percent in another (Appendix Table 1).  We expect that land not owned is 
less likely to be improved with bunds and microcatchments, due to the long-term nature 
of these investments.  
 
Livestock grazing in Burkina are still predominantly done on common lands.  The 
dominance of commons grazing over other feeding arrangements is often an appropriate 
response to the low density and “patchy” distribution of pasture resources (Scoones et al. 
1996).  Nonetheless, a rising density of people and livestock is leading farmers to take 
livestock into more intensive feeding systems, in response to less abundant pasture and 
less access to what pasture there is (Fisher et al. 2000).  One effect of more intensive 
feeding is that manure becomes more easily available, raising the productivity of soils 
and the potential value of SWC investments to prevent erosion and retain moisture 





In our data we measure the combined effect of pasture scarcity and pasture rights in terms 
of the intensity with which farmers manage their livestock, as the number of adults 
involved in feeding and monitoring animals on the farm.  Typical practice in commons 
grazing is for children to walk with the herds to monitor strays, deter theft, and return the 
animals at night.  As pasture becomes scarce and conflict over grazing areas worsens, 
herd owners adopt more intensive feeding systems that require increasing numbers of 
adult workers.  Thus child and adult labor represent distinct animal-feeding technologies, 
and are not close substitutes: in an auxiliary regression, the number of children 
monitoring animals is found to have no effect on the number of adults involved.  The 
number of adults is zero for many households, and the village-wide averages vary from 
0.03 to 4.67 (Appendix Table 1).
1   
 
The link between open-access grazing, manure use, and crop productivity was detailed by 
Dalton and Masters (1998), using a biophysical model of crop production linked to an 
economic model of crop and livestock choices, calibrated to farming conditions in 
Southern Mali.  In their model, it is optimal for farmers who have access to public 
grazing to use that resource, but when pasture taxes or forage scarcity induce farmers to 
intensify livestock management, doing so increases manure use and raises crop 
productivity.  We hypothesize that, in the Burkina Faso context, more intensive livestock 
                                                            
1 For this calculation we define as adult any person aged 15 or more, not in school at the time of 
the survey. During the survey, each individual aged of 15 or more was asked to list his principal 
and secondary activities during the rainy season and the off-season.  The number of adults 
involved in livestock monitoring in each household is the sum of those who reported that activity 




management could also lead to more investment in bunds and microcatchments, since 
manure availability helps increase the value of soil and the cost of erosion.  We expect 
that livestock management decisions are driven by pasture scarcity independently of 
SWC investment, but there is also some possibility of reverse causality as intensification 
of livestock care may be an endogenous response to SWC investment.  We investigate 
that possibility with exogeneity tests. 
 
2.3  Control variables 
To test for independent effects of our land, labor and property-rights variables, we must 
control for a wide range of other factors that may influence SWC investments.   
 
Our first set of controls are regional dummy variables, to account for omitted variables 
reflecting soil quality or other agroeconomic factors.  There may be some residual 
variance in these factors across villages and households, but to use village dummies 
would exhaust our degrees of freedom.   
 
A second kind of control is the share of the household’s land that is exploited by women 
as opposed to men.  This could matter for SWC investment if gender influences 
preferences, or affects access to particular resources.  In the Burkina context, women are 
likely to face more severe constraints in credit markets which would inhibit all kinds of 
investment, are may also have less secure land-use rights whether or not the land is 




needed to construct bunds and microcatchments, although in the Burkina context women 
do undertake these and many other onerous tasks. 
 
A third kind of control concerns household wealth and income.  Wealthier households 
may be have greater access to capital, facilitating investment, but they may also have 
higher opportunity costs of labor, inhibiting labor-intensive activities such as SWC.  One 
way we measure wealth is through households' reported real expenditure on non-food 
consumption goods, per adult equivalent, converted into foodgrain units at local relative 
prices for ease of comparison.  The underlying assumption is Engel’s law, by which 
nonfood expenditure rises rapidly with wealth, making it a particularly sensitive measure 
for our purposes.  Another observed measure of wealth is the value of agricultural 
equipment on the farm, representing the accumulation of capital assets over time.  And a 
third measure concerns the household’s access to off-farm income, which may provide 
farm finance but also draw labor off the farm.   
 
3. Analytical approach 
To distinguish the marginal effects of each variable, we assume that farmers respond to 
their circumstances in a consistent utility-maximizing way, as in Rahm and Huffman 
(1984) and Adesina and Zinnah (1993).  A particular technology is adopted when the 
anticipated utility from using it exceeds that of non-adoption. Though it is not observed 
directly, the utility (U) for a particular farmer (i) to use a particular technique (j) can be 
defined as a farm-specific function of some vector of technology characteristics, plus a 




Uij = aijGi(Xj) + eij, j = 1, 0 ; i = 1,…,n   (1) 
where 1 represents adoption of the new technology and 0 represents continued use of the 
old technology. The i
th farmer adopts j=1 if Ui1 > Ui0.  
 
For empirical purposes, the utility of adoption Uij can be inferred from farmers’ binary 
choice (adopt or not adopt) or some continuous choice over a predefined interval 
(intensity of adoption).  The former implies a probit or a logit model, as in Lapar and 
Pander (1999) and Anim (1999).  To consider the intensity of adoption, a Tobit model is 
needed, as in Lynne et al (1988), Adesina and Zinnah (1993) and Baidu-Forson (1999). 
Assuming that G is linear, from McDonald and Moffit (1980) we have the underlying 
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Where X is as defined above, Y is the dependent variable vector, β  is a vector of unknown 
parameters and µ  is a normally distributed disturbance term with mean 0 and constant 
variance σ
2. The expected value of Y can be written as:  
* ) ( EY z F EY =     (3) 
 
Where  F is the cumulative normal distribution, z is defined as ,  Y* is the 
observations above the threshold, and E stands for the expectation operator (see Greene 
1997 for full discussion.).  Using (3), McDonald and Moffit first showed that the 
marginal effect of an independent variable has two components and can be decomposed 
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The first term on the RHS is the expected response of current users to the change in xi 
and the second term is the response of non-users.  By multiplying both sides by xi/E(yi), 
one can interpret the results as the usual elasticities.  These elasticities have been termed 
as the elasticity of expected use intensity and the elasticity of adoption probability 
respectively.   
 
4. Data sources and survey methods 
The data were collected in eight villages in four different regions of Burkina Faso during 
the 1993 and 1994 cropping years. The covered regions are the Namentenga province in 
the Central Plateau, the Soum province in the North, the Kossi province in the West and 
the Nahouri province in the Southeast.   
 
In each region, two representative villages were chosen, one representing the wealthier 
villages and the other reflecting the poorer ones in that region, and then 35 households 
were randomly selected in each village except in the North where 40 households were 
chosen in anticipation of a higher dropout rate due to out-migration.  Agriculture is the 
main activity in all regions, but livestock is more important in the North, which has also 
experienced the greatest population pressure and soil degradation. 
 
The survey covered farm characteristics, production technologies, inputs and outcomes, 




was installed in each village with a coordinator for each survey region.  The farmer 
responsible each individual plot was interviewed, and the head of the household was 
interviewed regarding the common plots.  For some variables, such as field area, each 
plot operator was visited once, while multiple visits were required for management 
variables such labor allocation, animals feeding and monitoring.  Table 2 presents 
statistics for the variables used in our model, and selected others.  
 
5.  Estimation methods and model specification 
To recover correlations between SWC investments and their determinants (the β  
parameters of equation 2), we begin with standard MLE methods (Maddala 1983, Greene 
1997), and then use semi-parametric methods (following Powell 1984 and Deaton 1997) 
to remedy some non-standard characteristics of our data.  We also report results for the 
Cragg (1971) generalization of the Tobit, as a more flexible specification.
2  The MLE 
results and implied elasticities are presented in Tables 3 and 6, while the semi-parametric 
results are in Tables 4 and 7, and the Cragg model results are in Tables 5 and 8.  In all 
cases, separate regressions are reported for bunds, for microcatchments, and for the two 
techniques together.   
 
One of the key variables whose influence we wish to estimate, livestock intensification, 
could itself have been influenced by farmers’ SWC choices.  To test whether endogeneity 
                                                            
2 All estimates and test statistics were computed in Gauss.  Program and data files are available 




matters in this context we use the approach developed by Smith and Blundell (1986), as 
applied by Shively (1998), in which exogeneity holds if α =0 in the regression: 
ε α β β + + + = 2 1 2 2 1 1
~ v X y y ,   (5) 
where y1 is the adoption variable, y2 is the potentially endogenous variable, and  2
~ v  is the 
residuals from an OLS regression of y2 on a set of instrumental variables.
3  We can reject 
endogeneity at the 1 percent level for the three regressions, and hence no remedy is 
needed.  
 
Maximum likelihood Tobit estimates can be highly sensitive to non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity of the disturbance terms (Deaton 1997), and indeed our diagnostic tests 
reject normality and homoskedasticity for these regressions.  We present MLE results 
because the technique remains widely used, but also apply semi-parametric Censored 
Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimators that are less sensitive to non-normality 
and are robust to heteroskedasticity (Powell 1984).  Comparison between the CLAD and 
the MLE estimates provide an indication of the effects of non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity on the regression coefficients (Deaton 1987).  In this case, estimates 
are of somewhat lower magnitude and different significance levels using CLAD than 
using MLEs, but the principal results are the same.  
 
                                                            
3 The instruments used for this test were dummy variables for each village, the number of 
children in each household, and the number of animals owned by each household.  These are 
relevant to our instrumented variable (livestock intensification) because the villages differ in 
grazing resources, the children facilitate open-access grazing, and larger herds are more difficult 




In addition to normality and homoskedasticity of the errors, we are also concerned with 
specification of the model.  A first kind of specification test is whether Tobit itself is 
appropriate.  Despite its wide use to study adoption of SWC (Pender and Kerr 1999) and 
other techniques (Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Baidu-Forson 1999), it imposes restrictions 
that could bias our estimates.  In particular, the Tobit assumes that the explanatory 
variables have the same direction of effect on the probability of adoption and on its 
intensity (Greene 1997).  We find some evidence that this assumption does not hold, 
using the tests due to Lee and Maddala (1985) and Lin and Schmidt (1984), and so 
compare our Tobit results with estimates from the more general specification suggested 
by Cragg (1971).   
 
A further kind of specification test asks whether the same model parameters hold across 
all regions.  The basic model includes dummy variables to capture regional differences in 
the average level of investment, but we would also like to know if there are regional 
differences in the response of investment to land scarcity or property rights.  Our data set 
is not large enough to estimate separate regressions for each region, but we can construct 
a test for regional differences in the coefficients on key variables of interest, by adding 
the interaction of that variable with a dummy for each region (excluding the omitted one).  
To avoid adding a large number of regressors, we conduct separate tests for each 
variable, so the model becomes: 
 
k k k i X R X R X R X Y 3 3 2 2 1 1 α α α β + + + =                    (6) 




Where  Y and X are as defined previously, the Ri are dummy variables for the 
Namentenga, Kossi and Nahouri regions (with Soum the omitted region), and k is 
cropland scarcity, cropland ownership, or livestock intensification.  Our test asks whether 
the three RiXk variables in (6) can be omitted from the equation; using conditional 
moments following Chesher and Irish (1987).  In this case we are unable to reject that 
hypothesis, and therefore maintain the simpler aggregate model without regional 
interaction effects. 
 
All diagnostic and specification test results are presented at the bottom of Table 3.  In the 
Tobit context, these tests use the formula for generalized residuals due to Pagan and 




degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions under the null hypothesis.  The 
relevant degrees of freedom are shown with each test, and significance levels are 
indicated using asterisks.   
 
6.  Regression results  
Considering the results of our diagnostic and specification tests, we use three kinds of 
coefficient estimates:  the Tobit model with maximum-likelihood estimates (Table 3) and 
semi-parametric CLAD estimates (Table 4), and then the Cragg model with MLEs (Table 
5).  A total of twelve coefficients are estimated for each variable, testing its correlation 
with adoption of both techniques together, of bunds only, and of microcatchments only, 
plus separate estimates for adoption and intensity in the Cragg model.  




Looking across the twelve specifications, cropland area and male labor availability per 
household have generally insignificant effects on both kinds of SWC investment, while 
female labor availability generally reduces it, when controlling for other factors.  This 
result is consistent with the discussion in section 2.1 above, which noted that the 
anticipated effect of land and labor availability on SWC investment is ambiguous. 
 
The effects of cropland ownership and livestock intensification are expected to be 
positive, however, and the regression results generally support that hypothesis.  When 
controlling for factor abundance and other influences, the coefficient on cropland 
ownership is consistent in sign (negative in all cases except one, so that a greater share of 
land not owned is associated with less SWC investment) and significant at the 1 percent 
level in five of the twelve cases and at the 10 percent level in another five cases.  The 
coefficient on livestock intensification is also consistent in sign (positive in all cases 
except one, so that having more adults caring for livestock is associated with more SWC 
investment), although the magnitude is small and only significant in 4 of the 12 cases.  
 
Across the specifications, we see a clear pattern of support for the hypothesis that 
households are more likely to have made more SWC investment if they own the land they 
farm, and some further support for the hypothesis of more SWC investment if they have 
devoted more effort to taking animals off of commons grazing.  The effects of land 
scarcity and labor supply, which were thought to be ambiguous, turn out to be varied in 
sign and generally not significant.  




Among the control variables, none of the region dummy variables have coefficients that 
are consistent in sign, but the coefficient on gender is consistently negative (a larger 
proportion of land under female control is associated with lower SWC investment), and 
the three measures related to wealth or income (namely nonfood expenditure, agricultural 
equipment and off-farm income) are consistently negative, although only the agricultural 
equipment measure is consistently significant.   
 
The significance of property-rights variables, but not of land scarcity itself, supports the 
idea that institutional responses to population density rather than population density itself 
are what drive technical change.  In other words, increased density can lead to soil 
improvement, but only to the extent that it spurs changes in property rights that give the 
farmer an incentive to do so, by clarifying ownership of cropland and by forcing animals 
off commons grazing.  Differences in property rights could matter not only across 
households, but within them as well, to the extent that women’s less secure land rights 
helps explain the negative correlations we find between female labor or management and 
SWC investment.  
 
To illustrate the magnitude of the effects we estimate, Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the 
implied elasticities and bootstrapped standard errors for each regression.  Elasticities with 
respect to the share of cropland not owned and the number of adults feeding livestock are 
both under 50 percent using MLE methods, but over 90 percent in three of the six CLAD 
estimates.  These magnitudes are clearly nontrivial, but to obtain more reliable estimates 






This research uses farm-survey data to investigate the determinants of investment in soil 
and water conservation technologies at the field level.  We consider two different 
techniques, bunds and microcatchments, plus simultaneous adoption of both.  A 
maximum-likelihood Tobit model was used to link farmers’ investment in these 
techniques to a wide variety of observable variables, using data collected in four different 
regions of Burkina Faso.  Various diagnostic and robustness tests led to estimation of the 
Tobit using the semi-parametric method suggested by Powell (1984), and to relaxing 
Tobit assumptions using the more general model of Cragg (1971).  Across these various 
specifications, the empirical results of interest vary in magnitude but are consistent in 
sign and significance. 
 
Our central result is that, when controlling for land and labor availability plus a range of 
other factors, farmers’ SWC investments respond particularly to two policy-influenced 
variables: the degree to which their land is securely owned (as opposed to being 
borrowed or rented), and the degree to which their livestock are intensively managed (as 
opposed to being fed from open-access grazing).  These results imply that, as land 
becomes increasingly scarce, policies to take reflect land scarcity in more clearly defined 
property rights over cropped areas and commons grazing are likely to encourage 
investment in soils.  These findings provide some grounds for optimism that even the 
most resource-poor farmers can and do invest in conservation activities, when 
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Table 1.  Measures and hypothesized determinants of SWC investment 
Variable  Definition and units 
SWC investment   
  Bunds  Percent of cropland covered (%) 
  Microcatchments  Percent of cropland covered (%) 
  Both bunds and microcatchments  Percent of cropland covered (%) 
  
Land scarcity & property rights   
  Cropland scarcity   Cropland used per worker (adult equivalents) (ha) 
  Cropland ownership  Cropland used but not “owned” (%) 
  Livestock intensification   Adults involved in monitoring animals (no.) 
  
Control variables   
  Gender of farmer  Cropland exploited  by women  (%) 
  Wealth of household   Non-food consumption per cap., in kg of cereals  
  Equipment availability  Value of agricultural material (FCFA) 
  Off-farm income  Annual off-farm income per adult equivalent (FCFA) 
  Namentenga  Dummy (1=Namentenga, 0=others) 
  Kossi  Dummy (1=Kossi, 0=others) 
 Nahouri  Dummy (1=Nahouri, 0=others) 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics by area and for whole sample 
  Namentenga (n=61)   Soum (n=69)   Kossi (n=66)   Nahouri (n=62)   Overall (n=258)  
  Mean St dev Min  Max Mean St dev  Min  Max Mean St dev  Min  Max Mean St dev Min  Max Mean St dev Min  Max 
Dependent variables                                  
Bunds (%)  7.73 23.04  0.00  100.00  0.44  2.35 0.00  16.48 36.13 45.90 0.00 100.00 11.28 28.01  0.00  100.00 13.90 32.10  0.00 100.00 
Microcatchments (%)  21.60 33.49  0.00  100.00 50.01  41.49 0.00  100.00 14.88 21.86 0.00  77.12 28.07 33.47  0.00  100.00 29.03 35.88  0.00 100.00 
Bunds+microc. (%)  6.53 22.28  0.00  100.00  0.15  1.23 0.00  10.18 12.49 20.45 0.00  77.12  6.97 20.40  0.00  100.00  6.45 18.46  0.00 100.00 
                                 
Land scarcity & property rights                               
Cropland/worker (ha)  0.94 0.75  0.12  3.88 0.85  0.83  0.07  3.51 1.00 0.93  0.18  7.18 0.55 0.54  0.08  2.74 0.84 0.79  0.07  7.18 
Memo: cropland/hh (ha)  5.76 5.18  0.38  26.52 3.66  3.08  0.35  16.54 5.83 8.21  0.19 64.20 2.76 2.47  0.56  17.14 4.49 5.39  0.19 64.20 
Cropland not owned (%)  15.15 31.77  0.00  100.00 17.30  34.57 0.00  100.00 42.24 47.39 0.00 100.00  0.93  0.25  0.00  100.00 21.26  37.74 0.00  100.00 
Labor supply, female (no)  2.30  1.96 0.00  13.00 2.38  1.43  0.00  8.00 1.91 1.29  0.00  7.00 2.35 1.89  0.00  10.00 2.23  1.66 0.00  13.00 
Labor supply, male (no)  1.90 1.49  0.00 7.00  2.13 1.38  0.00 8.00  1.91 1.20  0.00  5.00  1.97 1.13  0.00 5.00  1.98  1.30 0.00  8.00 
Lvtsk. Intens. (# adults)  1.41 1.92  0.00  9.00 0.46  1.02  0.00  5.00 0.98 1.57  0.00  6.00 3.52 2.41  0.00  13.00 1.55 2.11  0.00 13.00 
                                 
Control variables                                 
Gender (% by women)  29.09 30.16  0.00  100.00 14.05  24.47 0.00  100.00  0.88 23.89 0.00 100.00 12.47 30.23  0.00  100.00 15.89 28.10  0.00 100.00 
Off-farm inc.('000 fcfa/yr) 26623 68150 0.00  522000 64489 104819 0.00  624000 30624 44035  0.00 222000 21156 19433 0.00  92250 36995 70011 0.00 624000 
Wealth*
  (Nonfood cons.)  67.49  99.78 2.86  759.95 144.98  132.05 14.02  740.04 151.41 187.55 11.28 1374.54 101.73 117.63 9.22  751.57 117.91 142.37 2.86 1374.54 
Ag. Equip. (1000 cfa) 11952 34632 0.00  142000 11422 34899 0.00  210000 30000 58472  0.00 278000 15454 32896 0.00  150000 17270 42215 0.00 278000 





Table 3.  Tobit regression results using MLE   
      
  Dependent variables: 
  Adoption of  Adoption of  Adoption of 
Independent variables:  both techniques    bunds  microcatchments 
Land and Labor Availability      
Cropland scarcity (ha)  -0.0030  0.0090  -0.0020 
  0.0031 0.0030  ***  0.0068 
Labor supply, female (no.)  -0.0332  -0.0523  -0.0649 
  0.0102 ***  0.0144 ***  0.0183 *** 
Labor supply, male (no.)  0.0013  -0.0348  0.0381 
  0.0070 0.0114***  0.0144  *** 
Property Rights      
Cropland ownership (% not owned)  -0.1700  -0.2820  -0.1434 
  0.0251 ***  0.0361 ***  0.0512 *** 
Livestock intens. (no. of adults)  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001 
  0.000024 ***  0.000034 ***  0.0001 
Control Variables      
Namentenga region (dummy)  0.0225  0.0310  -0.0384 
  0.0278 0.0445  0.0554 
Kossi region (dummy)  -0.1146  -0.1644  0.3934 
  0.0324 ***  0.0495 ***  0.0490 *** 
Nahouri region (dummy)  0.1577  0.4128  -0.0892 
  0.0281 ***  0.0403 ***  0.0633 * 
Gender (% farmed by women)  -0.0759  -0.0933  -0.2560 
  0.0371 **  0.0535 **  0.0605 *** 
Wealth (nonfood expenditure)  0.0371  0.0873  0.0585 
  0.0133 ***  0.0197 ***  0.0230 *** 
Agric. equipment (FCFA)  0.0012  0.0025  0.0012 
  0.0003  0.00035 ***  0.0006 ** 
Off-farm income (FCFA/yr)  0.0005 0.0006  0.0001 
  0.000075 ***  0.00015 ***  0.0002 
Constant -0.0410  -0.0658  0.2647 





Table 3.  (continued) 
      
  Dependent variables: 
  Adoption of  Adoption of  Adoption of 
Independent variables:  both techniques    bunds  microcatchments 
Log-likelihood  -176.680 -181.871  -204.680 
Diagnostic and specification tests      
Normality(2) 75.5  ***  277.9 ***  203.3 *** 
Homoskedasticity (1)  9.86 ***  6.70 ***  7.038 *** 
Tobit--Lee&Maddala(13) 171.9  ***  105.7 *** 37.60  *** 
Tobit--Lin&Schmidt(14) 379.5  ***  182.9 *** 27.12  ** 
      
Regional differences tests      
Land (3)  4.238  3.726  2.386 
Adults (3)  3.114  4.410  1.846 
Ownerships (3)  0.772  2.594  1.116 
           
Notes:  Figures in small italics are standard errors.  Asterisks indicate rejection of each null hypothesis, at 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence levels.  The null hypotheses are that coefficients are zero, the error term is 
normal and homoskedastic, the Tobit assumption of same explanatory for adoption and use-intensity holds, and 
the regional effects are zero, as described in the text. All diagnostic and specification tests are distributed as ￿￿￿￿ 
and the corresponding degree of freedom are in parenthesis.   





Table 4.  Tobit regressions results using semi-parametric CLAD 
      
  Dependent variables: 
  Adoption of  Adoption of  Adoption of 
Independent variables:  both techniques    bunds  microcatchments 
      
Land and Labor Availability      
Cropland scarcity (ha)  -0.0016  0.0056  -0.0012 
  0.0044 0.0063  0.0079 
Labor supply, female (no.)  -0.0183  -0.0271  -0.0360 
  0.0157 *  0.0324  0.0435 
Labor supply, male (no.)  0.0001  -0.0227  0.0233 
  0.0153 0.0181  *  0.0274 
Property Rights      
Cropland ownership (% not owned)  -0.0778  -0.1745  -0.0616 
  0.0488 *  0.1392 *  0.2695 
Livestock intens. (no. of adults)  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
  0.000035 *  0.0001  0.0002 
Control Variables      
Namentenga region (dummy)  0.0841  0.0722  -0.2590 
  0.1128 0.0963  0.1482  ** 
Kossi region (dummy)  0.1298  0.3287  -0.3362 
  0.0765 **  0.1082 ***  0.3090 
Nahouri region (dummy)  0.0515  0.0561  -0.2649 
  0.1074 0.4308  0.2413 
Gender (% farmed by women)  -0.0481  -0.0381  -0.1753 
  0.0730 0.2002  0.3879 
Wealth (nonfood expenditure)  0.0224  0.0549  0.0303 
  0.0294 0.0435  *  0.0649 
Agric. equipment (FCFA)  0.0006  0.0016  0.0004 
  0.0010 0.00114  *  0.0020 
Off-farm income (FCFA/yr)  0.0004 0.0004  0.0000 
  0.0005 0.0004  0.0012 
Constant 0.0124  0.0392  0.5550 
   0.1135 0.1079  0.198055*** 
Notes:  Figures in small italics are standard errors.  Asterisks indicate rejection of the null 
hypothesis that coefficients are zero, at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence levels.   
 





Table 5.  Cragg model regression results using MLE      
  Dependent variables: 
  Adoption of both tech.  Adoption of bunds  Adoption of microcatch. 
Independent variables:  Adoption   Use-intensity  Adoption   Use-intensity  Adoption   Use-intensity 
Land and Labor Availability           
Cropland scarcity (ha)  0.0323  0.0051  0.0405  0.0012  0.0215  -0.0120 
  0.0232 *  0.0094  0.0283 *  0.0052  0.0197  0.0087 * 
Labor supply, female (no.)  -0.2931  -0.1841  -0.2347  -0.1203  -0.0407  -0.0715 
  0.1252 **  0.1054 **  0.1089 **  0.0560 **  0.0790  0.0311 ** 
Labor supply, male (no.)  -0.0173  0.0387  -0.0379  0.0741  -0.0061  0.0572 
  0.0788  0.0247 *  0.0746  0.0375 **  0.0629  0.0232 *** 
Property Rights           
Cropland ownership (% not owned)  -0.9887  -0.5475  -0.8817  -0.2810  0.0252  -0.2543 
  0.3817 *  0.3911 *  0.3242 ***  0.1657 *  0.2380  0.1000 *** 
Livestock intens. (no. of adults)  0.0003  0.0001  0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  0.0003 0.0002  0.00028  *  0.0002  0.0003  0.0002 
Control Variables           
Namentenga region (dummy)  1.1274  1.2326  0.7156  0.1384  -0.5099  -0.1977 
  0.5032 ***  0.5041 ***  0.3768 **  0.1876  0.2459 **  0.1187 * 
Kossi region (dummy)  1.8054  1.3972  1.5814  -1.2342  -1.2616  0.1134 
  0.4964 **  0.7433 **  0.3708 ***  0.6278 **  0.2693 ***  0.0968 
Nahouri region (dummy)  0.9648  1.0910  0.9627  0.4748  -0.9281  -0.1424 
  0.4991 ***  0.4586 ***  0.3725 ***  0.1912 ***  0.2669 ***  0.1536 
Gender (% farmed by women)  -0.5389  -0.3622  -0.2824  -0.2882  -0.4784  -0.2297 
  0.4767 *  0.2648 *  0.3954  0.1911 *  0.3098 *  0.1566 * 
Wealth (nonfood expenditure)  0.2882  0.0913  0.2149  0.0254  0.1300  0.0165 
  0.1670 0.0970  0.150244*  0.0684  0.1226  0.0469 
Agric. equipment (FCFA)  0.0063  0.0024  0.0065  0.0007  0.0069  -0.0011 
  0.00277 *  0.0018 *  0.0026 ***  0.0009  0.00246 ***  0.0009 * 
Off-farm income (FCFA/yr)  0.0018 0.0014  0.0012 0.0007  -0.0007 0.0007 
  0.00164 **  0.0008**  0.0015  0.0007  0.0012  0.0004 ** 
Constant  -2.0702 -1.3660  -1.6414 0.7765  0.6758  0.6499 
  0.5127  1.2109  0.3930 ***  0.1826 ***  0.2969 ***  0.1149 *** 
           
Log-likelihood  -33.2368 -76.1115  -100.8230  -4.6114  -158.1950 -28.4422 
Specification test           
Log-likelihood ratio test (14)  134.66 ***   152.87 ***   36.09 ***   
                    
Notes:  Figures in small italics are standard errors.  Asterisks indicate rejection of the null hypotheses that 
coefficients are zero, at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence levels.  The null hypothesis for the specification 





Table 6.  Elasticities at sample mean using Tobit MLE      
            
  Adoption of both tech.  Adoption of bunds  Adopt. of microcatch. 
   Adoption  
Use-
intensity Adoption   
Use-
intensity Adoption  
Use-
intensity 
Independent variables            
Cropland scarcity (ha)  -0.0466  -0.1108  0.1712  0.3362  -0.0606  -0.0598 
Labor supply, female (no.)  -0.2242  -0.5328  -0.4392  -0.8623  -0.8826  -0.8712 
Labor supply, male (no.)  0.0099  0.0236  -0.3294  -0.6468  0.5847  0.5771 
Cropland ownership (% not owned)  -0.1230  -0.2924  -0.2543  -0.4993  -0.2093  -0.2066 
Livestock intens. (no. of adults)  0.0791  0.1880  0.2530  0.4968  -0.1409  -0.1391 
Namentenga region (dummy)  0.0181  0.0430  0.0311  0.0611  -0.0623  -0.0615 
Kossi region (dummy)  -0.1044  -0.2481  -0.1865  -0.3662  0.7223  0.7129 
Nahouri region (dummy)  0.1373  0.3264  0.4479  0.8795  -0.1567  -0.1547 
Gender (% farmed by women)  -0.0411  -0.0976  -0.0628  -0.1234  -0.2791  -0.2755 
Wealth (nonfood expenditure)  0.0678  0.1610  0.1988  0.3904  0.2156  0.2128 
Agric. equipment (FCFA)  0.0718  0.1707  0.1845  0.3624  0.1408  0.1390 
Off-farm income (FCFA/yr)  0.0570 0.1354  0.0895  0.1758  0.0131  0.0129 
Notes:  For regional dummy variables, the values reported are changes in the dependent variable in 
response to the change in the binary variable from zero to one.   






Table 7.  Elasticities at sample mean using Tobit CLAD     
           
 Both  techniques  Bunds  Microcatchments 
   Adoption   Use-intens. Adoption  Use-intens. Adoption   Use-intens. 
Independent variables          
Cropland scarcity (ha)  -0.3316  -0.4020  0.6147  0.6391  -0.0915  -0.0631 
Labor supply, female (no.)  -1.6330  -1.9796  -1.3184 -1.3706 -1.1755 -0.8107 
Labor supply, male (no.)  0.0141  0.0171  -1.2429  -1.2922  0.8557  0.5902 
Cropland ownership (% not owned)  -0.7462  -0.9046  -0.9113 -0.9474 -0.2157 -0.1488 
Livestock intens. (no. of adults)  0.8328  1.0096  0.9161  0.9524  -0.2084  -0.1438 
Namentenga region (dummy)  0.8965  1.0868  0.4191 0.4357  -1.0092 -0.6961 
Kossi region (dummy)  1.4976  1.8155  2.0657  2.1476  -1.4177  -0.9778 
Nahouri region (dummy)  0.5586  0.6772  0.3311 0.3442  -1.0493 -0.7238 
Gender (% farmed by women)  -0.3442  -0.4173  -0.1487  -0.1545  -0.4589  -0.3165 
Wealth (nonfood expenditure)  0.5425  0.6577  0.7233  0.7520 0.2676 0.1846 
Agric. equipment (FCFA)  0.4607  0.5585  0.6677  0.6942  0.1174  0.0810 
Off-farm income (FCFA/yr)  0.6083 0.7374  0.3372  0.3506 0.0220 0.0152 
Notes:  For regional dummy variables, the values reported are changes in the dependent variable in response 





Table 8. Elasticities at sample mean using the Cragg model estimates   
             
 Both  techniques  Bunds  Microcatchments 
   Adoption  Use-intens. Adoption  Use-intens. Adoption  Use-intens. 
Independent variables           
Cropland scarcity (ha)  0.0046  0.0770  0.0096  0.1196  0.0085  -0.0051 
Labor supply, female (no.)  -0.0417  -0.7401  -0.0554  -0.5239  -0.0161  -0.2218 
Labor supply, male (no.)  -0.0025  0.1927  -0.0089  0.1523  -0.0024  0.1494 
Cropland ownership (% not owned)  -0.1407  -0.1238  -0.2081  -0.1217  0.0100  -0.0568 
Livestock intens. (no. of adults)  0.0000  0.1889  0.0001  0.1341  0.0000  -0.0196 
Namentenga region (dummy)  0.1604  0.5176  0.1689  0.2186  -0.2023  -0.1543 
Kossi region (dummy)  0.2569  1.7602  0.3733  1.2200  -0.5006  -0.1512 
Nahouri region (dummy)  0.1373  0.5236  0.2272  0.3671  -0.3683  -0.1183 
Gender (% farmed by women)  -0.0767  -0.0858  -0.0667  -0.0769  -0.1898  -0.0721 
Wealth (nonfood expenditure)  0.0410  0.1536  0.0507  0.1146  0.0516  0.0526 
Agric. equipment (FCFA)  0.0009  0.2499  0.0015  0.1538  0.0027  0.0253 
Off-farm income (FCFA/yr)  0.0003 0.1243  0.0003 0.0657  -0.0003  0.0356 
Notes:  For regional dummy variables, the values reported are changes in the dependent variable in 






Appendix:  Variable means by survey village 
 
 Namentenga  Soum  Kossi  Nahouri 
 vill. 1  vill. 2  vill. 1  vill. 2  vill. 1  vill. 2  vill. 1  vill. 2 
  (n=33) (n=29) (n=37) (n=32) (n=34) (n=32) (n=32) (n=30) 
Dependent variables          
Bunds  (%)  9.23 6.09 0.00 0.95  70.13  0 1.35  21.88 
Microcatchments  (%)  24.09 18.85 59.88 38.58 28.89  0  0.75 57.20 
Bunds+Microc.  (%)  9.22 3.55 0.00 0.32  24.25 0.00 0.00  14.41 
         
Land scarcity & property rights        
Cropland  (ha/adult-equivalent)  0.79 1.11 0.46 1.28 0.95 1.05 0.48 0.63 
Cropland/household  (ha)  6.56 4.87 3.86 3.43 6.38 5.24 3.56 1.90 
Labor  supply,  female  (no)  2.63 1.93 2.81 1.88 1.82 2.00 2.75 1.70 
Labor  supply,  male  (no)  1.90 1.90 2.35 1.88 1.85 1.97 2.22 1.93 
Cropland not owned (%)  4.46  26.96  26.99  6.10  19.22  44.56  0.00  19.31 
Livestock intens. (# adults )  .94  1.93  .027  .97  1.61  .31  2.44  4.67 
          
Control variables          
Gender (%farmed by women)  21.53  37.42     16.86  10.80  9.52  8.07  9.41  15.73 
Off-farm income (cfa/yr)  20810 33037 82133 48400 28093 33312 22772 19432 
Nonfood  expenditure    50.92 85.77 72.94  228.26  239.99 57.31  144.66 55.93 
Agricultural  equip.  (cfa)  16300 7155  14743 7582  56986 1328  28067 2000 
Note:  Area per adult equivalent is total land divided by the number of household members older than 15 
years who report agricultural production as principal activity, converted to adult equivalents.  
 
 